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Initiatives intended to support and advance the scholarship of teaching have 
become common in Canada as well as internationally. Nonetheless, the no-
tion of a scholarship of teaching remains contested and has been described as 
under-theorized. In this conceptual study, I contribute to the ongoing “theory 
debate” in the scholarship of teaching, applying a philosophical lens. I pro-
pose that Alasdair MacIntyre’s account of “practices,” including concepts of 
virtue, standards of excellence, internal goods, and transformation, offers a 
useful theoretical framework by which to identify the nature and defend the 
purposes and desired outcomes of this domain of scholarship. I argue that the 
moral virtues of justice, courage, and truthfulness, identified by MacIntyre as 
fundamental to all social practices, are essential also for meaningful engage-
ment in the practice of the scholarship of teaching, but that two additional 
and overarching virtues are needed: authenticity and phronesis.
Résumé
Les initiatives ayant pour but d’encourager et de développer la scholarship of 
teaching sont devenues courantes au Canada ainsi qu’ailleurs dans le monde. 
Toutefois, la notion même de scholarship of teaching demeure contestée et 
on a même dit qu’elle manquait de fondement théorique. Dans le présent 
article conceptuel, je contribue au « débat  théorique » actuel en lien avec 
la scholarship of teaching en adoptant une perspective philosophique. 
Je suggère que les travaux d’Alasdair MacIntyre sur les « pratiques » – y 
compris sur les notions de vertu, de normes d’excellence, de biens internes, 
et de transformation – nous offrent un cadre théorique pouvant servir à 
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identifier la nature de ce type de science ainsi qu’à défendre ses objectifs et 
résultats attendus. Je soutiens que les vertus morales de justice, de courage et 
d’honnêteté, identifiées par MacIntyre comme étant fondamentales à toutes 
pratiques sociales, sont également essentielles pour un engagement profond 
envers la pratique de la scholarship of teaching, mais que deux autres vertus 
plus générales sont aussi nécessaires, à savoir l’authenticité et la phronesis. 
The Contested Nature of the “Scholarship of Teaching”
Scholarship has always been fundamental to university teaching, but reference to a 
“scholarship of teaching” is a rather recent occurrence. In the widely cited report Schol-
arship Reconsidered: Priorities of the Professoriate, Boyer (1990) offered a historical 
overview of how the meaning of scholarship had changed over the centuries, remind-
ing his readers that the widespread understanding that scholarship equals the discovery 
of new discipline-specific knowledge is a relatively recent interpretation. Reconsidering 
scholarship, he argued, involved, on the one hand, looking forward and developing new 
conceptualizations, such as discovering but also integrating knowledge, and, on the other 
hand, looking back and reclaiming historical ones, such as applying knowledge and shar-
ing knowledge. This more inclusive conception of scholarship was reflected in the four-
faceted model of scholarship he proposed: the scholarship of discovery; the scholarship 
of integration; the scholarship of application; and the scholarship of teaching. Boyer did 
not make clear what he meant by a “scholarship of teaching”; he did, however, empha-
size that academic teachers must “continuously examine” their pedagogical procedures 
(Boyer, 1990, p. 24). 
Since Scholarship Reconsidered first appeared, others have engaged in the important 
task of trying to articulate the nature of a “scholarship of teaching” (e.g., Healey, 2003; 
Hutchings & Shulman, 1999; Kreber & Cranton, 2000; Shulman, 2000). One perspective 
in particular that has gained widespread acceptance and currency is the view that the 
scholarship of teaching refers to inquiries higher education teachers undertake into as-
pects of their own particular contexts of teaching, and that the insights gained from such 
inquiries then are made public (Hutchings & Shulman, 1999). 
Although Boyer had coined the term “scholarship of teaching,” later commentators 
added the words “and learning,” resulting in the now popular notion of a “scholarship of 
teaching and learning,” often abbreviated as SOTL (which I will use on occasion in this 
article). The reasons for adding “and learning” seem obvious enough: first, a message 
implicit in Scholarship Reconsidered was that university teachers have a professional re-
sponsibility to further student learning; second, an understanding had developed within 
our academic communities that teaching could be enhanced by focusing on, understand-
ing better, and, indeed, inquiring systematically into student learning (think also of the 
so-called paradigm shift popularized through the work of Barr and Tagg [1995]); and 
third, there is an understanding, shared by many, that the scholarship of teaching would 
miss its mark if its purpose were not to support the learning (and, we might add, the de-
velopment) of students.  
Over the past several years, many countries, including Canada, have established initia-
tives designed to promote such inquiry or scholarship. Nonetheless, the notion of a schol-
arship of teaching and learning remains contested. While optimistic commentators suggest 
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that SOTL is gradually becoming intellectually richer as a result of inquiries academics 
undertake into teaching and learning that are shared across disciplines (Huber & Morreale, 
2002), critics observe that the dominant discourse on SOTL is impoverished and “under-
theorized” (e.g., Boshier, 2009; McLean, 2006). The point of this critique is not that exami-
nations of classroom practices are irrelevant but rather that these often remain unrelated 
to any theoretical constructs, let alone explicit social and socio-political purposes. 
Moreover, it could be argued (as I believe was the intention of an anonymous reviewer 
of this article, with whom I agree, although I here put my own spin on the comment 
that was made) that present interest in supporting and furthering SOTL is linked to two 
trends: (i) universities feeling increased pressure to demonstrate accountability, to both 
the public and governments, for the quality of teaching they provide (and thus for how 
tax payers’ money is being spent); and (ii) universities feeling increased pressure to pro-
duce highly skilled workers, i.e., knowledge workers, who will eventually contribute to 
their local and national communities and, by extension, support the country’s economic 
competitiveness in a global market. It is no coincidence that the need for highly qualified 
university graduates (who, it is anticipated, will contribute effectively to industry growth, 
to politics and international relations in a globally networked knowledge economy, and to 
research and innovation) is being emphasized in policy briefs on the purposes of higher 
education at the same time that SOTL initiatives are being encouraged. Both trends—to-
wards increased performativity and the adoption of human-capital approaches to pro-
mote development—are, of course, not unique to Canada but observable in all countries 
affected by neoliberal policies. Note in this context that from 2005 to 2010, the Higher 
Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE), for example, invested £315 million 
into the establishment of 74 centres for excellence in teaching and learning (CETLs), each 
CETL receiving a capital sum ranging from £0.8 million to £2.35 million, plus £200,000 
to £500,000 per annum for five years (Smith, 2006). The UK government white paper 
titled The Future of Higher Education (DfES, 2003), guiding higher education policy at 
the time, included chapters entitled “Research Excellence—Building on our Strengths,” 
“Higher Education and Business—Exchanging and Developing Knowledge and Skills,” 
and “Teaching and Learning—Delivering Excellence,” presented in that order.  
The purpose of the present article is not to offer an analysis of the socio-political con-
text of SOTL. Instead, my intention is to engage in a philosophical analysis—informed by 
Alasdair MacIntyre’s account of “practices”—aimed at contributing to debate about what 
SOTL is ultimately for, what its nature is, and, by implication, whether theory can help 
us in answering these questions. It should go without saying that the particular socio-
political context within which present SOTL initiatives are being encouraged is relevant 
to this discussion, but as background only.  
Despite an ongoing debate over “which theories are relevant” and “what should be the 
role and nature of theory” in the examination of teaching and learning (e.g., Clegg, 2009; 
Huber & Hutchings, 2008; Hutchings, Huber, & Ciccone, 2011), to my knowledge no one 
has yet taken a broader perspective and asked whether theory could guide us in answer-
ing these more fundamental questions about the nature and purpose of SOTL. One no-
table exception to this is a conference paper by University of British Columbia professor 
David Coulter (2004), who developed a rationale for, and intriguing interpretation of, the 
scholarship of teaching, through the lens of Hannah Arendt’s notion of “action.” Although 
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the arguments presented in his paper are different to what is suggested here, the underly-
ing intent—namely, to use theory to grasp the meaning of SOTL, which then could serve 
as a guide for engagement—is similar.
While it might be suggested that the fundamental question of what SOTL is for has 
already been answered, given a widespread understanding that we engage in this work so 
as to improve the learning of students (e.g., Huber & Hutchings, 2005), my point is that 
this understanding, to date, has not been defended on the basis of a systematic and theory-
guided analysis of SOTL itself, nor have we explored what “inquiry,” in the context of SOTL, 
could mean next to formal/systematic empirical investigations into university pedagogy.  
I propose that the philosophical notion of a practice, as developed by Alasdair Ma-
cIntyre (2007) in his now classic text After Virtue—particularly the concepts of virtue, 
standards of excellence, internal goods, and transformation—offers theoretical guidance 
for identifying and defending the nature and purposes of SOTL, and possibly reveals the 
wide range of ways in which we might engage with this domain of our academic practice. 
My purpose is to show how the virtues of justice, courage, and truthfulness, which Ma-
cIntyre highlights as being integral to all social practices, are critical to SOTL if it is to have 
personal, professional, educational, and social value. I furthermore propose that this par-
ticular social practice demands, and also furthers, the development of two additional and 
overarching virtues: those of authenticity and phronesis (or good practical judgement). I 
shall first spell out what MacIntyre means by a practice. I shall then explore whether SOTL 
meets the interrelated and yet distinct criteria of a practice that MacIntyre identified.
Is the Scholarship of Teaching and Learning a MacIntyrean Practice?
In a frequently cited section of After Virtue, MacIntyre (2007) states:
by a practice I am going to mean any coherent and complex form of socially estab-
lished cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of 
activity are realised in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence 
which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the 
result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the 
ends and goods involved, are systematically extended. (p. 187, emphases added)
Practices thus take place within a community. Involvement in the practice helps us to 
realize certain goods and leads us to conceptualize these goods in a particular way. The 
goods internal to the activity in which we are engaged become available to us as we exer-
cise certain “virtues” necessary for achieving the standards of excellence associated with 
the practice. Virtues “enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to ‘practices’” 
(MacIntyre, 2007, p. 191). What we come to value about, and can gain from, the activity 
itself—that is, its internal goods—become accessible to us through practising particular 
virtues, and here he identifies in particular the moral virtues of justice, courage, and truth-
fulness. “Practices” are thus guided by a certain ethic. I shall now proceed to show that 
SOTL is strengthened if it is interpreted, and enacted, as a practice in this particular sense. 
I should perhaps add that I am concerned here principally with the question of wheth-
er the activity of the scholarship of teaching and learning is usefully construed as a Mac-
Intyrean practice, not whether teaching as such qualifies as a practice; the latter ques-
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tion is a little different and has been widely debated in the literature (e.g., Dunne, 2003; 
McLaughlin, 2003; Noddings, 2003). MacIntyre himself, I add in passing, is not of the 
position that the activity of teaching qualifies as a practice, arguing instead that teaching 
is fundamental to all social practices (the latter being—to offer an example from the high-
er education context—the particular disciplines, with their distinct traditions and norms, 
into which we have become socialized and that we then teach to students). In other words, 
according to MacIntyre, teaching is an important aspect of all social practices, but teach-
ing as such, or on its own, is not a practice. The counter-argument, I should also briefly 
mention, is that teaching has become an institutionalized activity with its own norms and 
traditions and therefore is a practice.  
Whilst the debate around whether teaching is or is not a practice is indeed interesting, 
it is not at the core of my argument. I would like to stress that the compelling aspect of the 
scholarship of teaching (and learning) is precisely that it merges the practice of teaching 
with the practice of inquiry into teaching (and learning). We could, conceivably, witness 
a form of teaching that is not underpinned by any form of inquiry. The practice of SOTL 
includes teaching but goes beyond it through inquiry.
To qualify as a MacIntyrean practice, SOTL would need to fulfil four distinct yet inter-
related criteria: (i) it would be practised within a community; (ii) it would lead us to rec-
ognize the internal goods to be gained from the activity; (iii) these internal goods would 
be realized through virtues that also help us achieve certain standards of excellence; and 
(iv) it would involve a transformative process leading us to reconceptualize, and eventu-
ally achieve, the internal goods. I will consider each of these criteria in turn.
A Socially Established Activity That Is Practised Cooperatively
For MacIntyre, practices are cooperative human activities because they are guided by a 
shared rationality. It is through interactions with others that we learn what count as good 
reasons to act, and how to act well. In a later work, MacIntyre (2009) elaborates: “We 
become independent practical reasoners through participation in a set of relationships 
to certain particular others” (p. 99), and “[p]ractical reasoning is by its nature, on the 
generally Aristotelian view that I have been taking, reasoning together with others, gen-
erally within some determinate set of social relationships” (p. 107). Scholars of teaching 
and learning learn about the practice of SOTL by interacting with their peers, by opening 
the insights resulting from their inquiries to critique and evaluation, by enabling others 
to build on this work, or simply by going public (Hutchings & Shulman, 1999). It follows 
that SOTL is practised cooperatively within a community of scholars who are bound by a 
shared rationality, and who adopt an inquiry-oriented approach towards their teaching. 
The community, therefore, is necessary for the advancement of the practice of SOTL. 
A Practice Offering Internal Goods
Internal goods are accessible only through the particular activity itself and can be un-
derstood as the reason we choose to involve ourselves in this, and not in another, activity. 
Although the internal goods are experienced or enjoyed by the individual involved in the 
practice, they ultimately benefit the entire community engaged in this practice and, thus, 
constitute community property. People who choose to engage in certain practices do so 
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because they appreciate, and take pleasure in, the internal goods these practices provide. 
The internal goods are related to the essence of what the practice is about. 
It is not so easy to put one’s finger on what the internal goods are in relation to SOTL. 
However, Sellman (2000), discussing the practice of nursing, argues that the internal 
goods of this practice lie in “the satisfaction of helping others” (p. 28). Noddings (2003), 
discussing the practice of teaching, identifies “some responsibility for the development 
of students as whole persons” (p. 249) as the internal good. Extrapolating from these 
two practices and their internal goods to the practice of SOTL, we might conclude that 
the internal goods available to us through SOTL include the enjoyment, achievement or 
satisfaction we experience by 
• inquiring into significant questions relating to teaching and learning, 
• deepening our understanding of these issues, 
• growing into ourselves and becoming critically aware of the inner motives that 
guide us in this work, and
•	 doing what is in the important interests of students.
The last point I understand in line with Noddings’s (2003) emphasis on our “respon-
sibility for the development of students as whole persons” (p. 249). To make this link a 
little clearer, and thus to unpack what the important interests of students are, I will take 
momentary departure from MacIntryre and turn to other theorists. I will return to Ma-
cIntyre’s criteria of a practice once the meaning of the students’ important interests has 
been established.   
Interlude: Furthering the important interests of students. In understand-
ing the students’ important interests it is helpful to draw on philosophical literature that 
is chiefly concerned with highlighting aspects of our existence that are distinctly human 
qualities, or “interests.” Human interests arise from an experience of fundamental need 
that must be satisfied for humans to flourish. Heidegger (1962), for example, saw the 
distinctiveness of human existence in our potential openness to our own particular pos-
sibilities. Separating from a state of unawareness of our deepest inner motives and mov-
ing closer to our full potential of being he saw as a fundamental human need (in order to 
live a meaningful, fully flourishing life). Habermas (1971), although arguing from a dif-
ferent philosophical perspective, similarly identified emancipation, personal growth, or 
self-development as a fundamental human interest (next to the technical interest in con-
trolling one’s environment and the practical interest in living in harmony with others). To 
move to yet another philosophical perspective, proponents of the capabilities approach 
to human development (Nussbaum, 2000; Nussbaum & Sen, 1993) recognize that being 
able to choose a life one has reason to value is a fundamental human interest. Nussbaum 
(2000) proposed that “to be able to search for an understanding of the ultimate meaning 
of one’s life in one’s own way is among the most important aspects of a life that is truly 
human” (p. 179). What can we conclude from these ideas? 
Recognizing, yet reconciling, the differences between the philosophical perspectives 
just outlined, I argue that what is in the students’ important interests, as compared to their 
felt interests or needs (for a difference, see, for example, Brookfield [2005]), is nothing less 
than the furthering of the students’ authenticity. How might one justify such a claim? 
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It is of course important that chemistry students learn the periodic table and eventu-
ally develop an advanced understanding of chemistry, math students gain knowledge of 
calculus, history students learn how to critically analyze social events, and music students 
learn to interpret and create music, and that all of them learn to use evidence to substan-
tiate conclusions, and so forth. And yet, ultimately, what is in the important interests of 
all students is that higher education offers them space, or opportunities, to strive towards 
authenticity—through the study of their discipline(s). To put it differently, what is impor-
tant is that higher education affords students opportunities for transformation in under-
standing (subject matter) and being (self).
Highlighting authenticity and being as important to student learning in higher education is 
no longer a new idea. In recent years, the higher education literature has made reference to the 
“ontological turn” (e.g., Barnett, 2004, 2005; Dall’Alba & Barnacle, 2007). It is increasingly rec-
ognized that what matters is not merely whether higher education affects what and how students 
know, and what they can do with this acquired knowledge, but also, and importantly, who they are 
becoming (e.g., Baxter Magolda, 2009; Chickering, Dalton, & Stamm, 2006). However, authentic-
ity is a complex and contested notion that “suffers from inextricable ties to various ideologies and 
philosophies” (Vannini, 2007, p. 65). Nonetheless, three philosophical perspectives can typically 
be distinguished: the existential (Heidegger, 1962); the critical (Habermas, 1971), and the com-
munitarian (e.g., Taylor, 1991). I will briefly outline what students coming into their authenticity 
would look like when interpreted from each of these perspectives, as doing so offers some further 
clues as to what serving the important interests of students might mean. 
The existential perspective suggests that students come into their authenticity as they 
grow into themselves, develop a disposition to learn for themselves (Entwistle & McCune, 
2009), become “disencumbered” from other voices (Barnett, 2007), and become authors 
of their own lives (Baxter Magolda, 2009). Students grow into an awareness of their own 
unique possibilities and strive towards these. Students coming into their authenticity, 
then, often involves that they develop greater knowledge of a particular subject (and of 
themselves); but importantly, they do not just come to know more but come to know dif-
ferently than they did before. This qualitative change in knowing is often accompanied by 
a shift in their identity and a greater sense of personal commitments. 
Building on this, the critical perspective suggests that students become conscious of 
how the socially constructed beliefs and expectations they hold about what is possible 
for them have limited their choices up to now. Students grow into their authenticity as 
they become aware of their real possibilities through critical reflection and critical self-
reflection. 
Finally, the communitarian perspective suggests that students come into their au-
thenticity as they begin to recognize their social interrelatedness and understand them-
selves as members of a wider social community (Taylor, 1991), if not as citizens of the 
world (Nussbaum, 1997) towards which they feel a commitment and responsibility. Bax-
ter Magolda (2009) argues that an important purpose of higher education is to promote 
the students’ relational maturity, including an “understanding of and commitment to 
one’s own interests in interaction with understanding and commitment to the interests of 
others” (Baxter Magolda, 2009, p. 144). 
Furthering the students’ authenticity, Barnett (2004, 2005) argued, is the important 
task of higher education in the present age of epistemological uncertainty and “super-
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complexity” (Barnett, 2004, p. 252). He uses the latter term as a shorthand to refer to 
the multi-level challenges students are exposed to in making sense of their experiences. 
Students’ authenticity here is understood as a fundamental personal disposition (a way 
of being) that is necessary to cope in a world where students cannot take refuge in estab-
lished discourses and ready-made solutions, but are required to take a stance on issues 
and commit themselves to their claims (Barnett, 2004, 2005).
Thus far, I have argued that (i) SOTL offers internal goods; (ii) these internal goods 
include finding value, purpose, or satisfaction in furthering and inquiring into how to 
further the important interests of students; and (iii) furthering the important interests 
of students involves helping students grow into their authenticity (and I have discussed, 
in outline, what students coming into their authenticity implies). Having digressed from 
MacIntyre in order to establish what the important interests of students are, based on a 
reasoned argument drawing on a wide range of philosophical ideas concerned with fun-
damental human needs, I shall now return to MacIntyre’s criteria of a practice to explore 
what SOTL, when understood as a MacIntyrean practice, would look like. Whether the 
internal goods are realizable through a process of trying to achieve the standards of excel-
lence associated with SOTL—and, if so, how—I explore next.
Standards of Excellence in SOTL
MacIntyre (2007) asserts that all practices are associated with particular standards 
of excellence. Diamond (1993) summarized the standard of excellence expected of schol-
arship as the work requiring a high level of discipline-specific expertise, breaking new 
ground, and being replicable, documentable, peer-reviewable, and of significance or im-
pact. Glassick, Huber, and Maeroff (1997) proposed a different standard, arguing that the 
work of the scholar should demonstrate clear goals, adequate preparation, appropriate 
methodology, effective presentation, significant results, and reflective critique. Andresen 
(2000) stressed the importance of a deep knowledge base, an inquiry-orientation, criti-
cal reflectivity, peer review, and going public. Although not speaking of scholarship per 
se but about the distinctive nature of learning in the context of higher education, Barnett 
(1992) suggested that “[c]ontained within the idea of higher education are the notions 
of critical dialogue, of self-reflection, of conversations, and of continuing redefinition. 
They do justice to the idea of higher education” (p. 29). Critical dialogue, self-reflection, 
conversations, and continuous redefinition describe the nature of learning in the context 
of higher education; but are these descriptors not also brilliant descriptors of scholarship 
itself? The distinctive nature of learning in higher education is that is it characterized by 
a process of scholarship. Dictionary definitions of the term scholarship also point to the 
process of inquiry (e.g., “serious detailed study,” according to the online Collins English 
Dictionary). Barnett’s standards of learning are also standards of scholarship when the 
latter is understood as a process of inquiry. Commenting on SOTL specifically, rather 
than scholarship in general, Shulman (2000) proposed that SOTL implies that our work 
as teachers becomes public, peer-reviewed, critiqued, and exchanged with members of 
our professional communities. So clearly, the practice of SOTL has been associated with 
certain standards. While all the standards mentioned here are interesting, the subsequent 
discussion will be limited to those proposed by Andresen (2000) and Barnett (1992), 
because their emphasis on critical reflectivity seems particularly relevant to “practices.”
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The question to be answered is this: can SOTL’s internal goods, principally the value 
we experience in supporting the students’ important interests through inquiry, be at-
tained by striving to achieve the above standards of excellence? And, if so, how might vir-
tue guide us in this process? As was noted earlier, MacIntyre (2007) argues that practices 
are sustained by the moral virtues of truthfulness, courage, and justice, and these virtues 
themselves are further developed as we engage in the practice. Why SOTL should be sus-
tained through these virtues, and the virtues be further developed through our engage-
ment in SOTL, will concern us next.
The Virtues of Truthfulness, Courage, and Justice
Truthfulness is a multi-faceted concept. It may simply refer to “not cheating,” “be-
ing honest,” and “being sincere,” but it can also have a more complex meaning. It may 
also pertain to “being honest with oneself”—as in becoming aware, through critical self-
reflection, of how one’s assumptions have been distorted, thereby developing a more valid 
perspective on issues. Courage refers to a disposition to do what one believes the situa-
tion requires while being aware of the risks involved. Finally, justice, or fairness, in SOTL 
clearly goes beyond judging our colleagues’ (or students’) work according to agreed-upon 
criteria (although this is part of it); being just or fair, as a scholar of teaching, refers also to 
our own practice as teachers and involves making sure that students have an equal chance 
to succeed, by inquiring into how our practice can become more just or fair. Being just 
or fair, as a scholar of teaching, means ensuring that students (or communities) who are 
disadvantaged are supported in asserting their claims to recognition. Being just or fair in 
this sense relies on the virtue of courage (and, as Nixon [2008] suggests, compassion). 
The virtues of truthfulness, courage, and justice are therefore interrelated. Being truthful, 
and being fair or just, both require courage. My purpose here is to highlight that inquiry 
into our teaching practice, or SOTL, relies on these virtues. But more can be said: these 
same virtues are also critical for attaining the standards of excellence we associate with 
SOTL (see also Kreber [in press]). 
The standard of excellence of constructing a valid “knowledge base” (Andresen, 2000), 
the latter referring to the processes (and policies and purposes) of university teaching and 
the content that we teach, would be impossible to attain without being truthful—that is, 
accurate, sincere, honest, and “true to ourselves.” We build and extend our knowledge 
base as we adopt an “inquiry-orientation” (Andresen, 2000), thereby ensuring that this 
knowledge is never taken for granted but instead is continuously re-examined (Boyer, 
1990). But engagement in true inquiry is inconceivable without a willingness to take risks 
or be courageous. 
Moreover, an inquiry-orientation is supported by yet another standard of excellence, 
that of “critical reflectivity” (Andresen, 2000; Barnett 1992). The latter implies stepping 
back and considering whether conclusions we have reached about what we think we know 
or understand about university teaching and learning, as well as the discipline itself, are 
accurate and/or desirable and whether alternatives are possible. (Critical reflectivity also 
includes reflecting on why universities support SOTL at this point in time, as was noted 
at the beginning of this article, why certain kinds of SOTL activity are encouraged, and 
whether those that are encouraged—and rewarded—are indeed the most important to 
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pursue.) Critical reflectivity is inconceivable without the virtues of truthfulness and cour-
age, but it also requires the virtue of justice or fairness. Being just or fair means that 
everything is open for examination, not only those questions that are easy to inquire into, 
are straightforward to document or publish in the form of a refereed journal article, or 
leave unchallenged how things are ordinarily done. 
The standards of “peer review and going public” (Andresen, 2000), or as Barnett 
(1992) put it, “critical dialogue and conversation with others,” strengthen our inquiry 
and critical reflectivity, and these again require courage and truthfulness. Without the 
standards of “peer review and going public,” our reflectivity would remain largely inward 
looking and we would be less aware of the assumptions we customarily take for granted. 
We need some form of peer review, critical dialogue, and public debate in order to chal-
lenge our thinking and revise our practices in accordance with the new insights gained. 
When the space in which questions and critique are encouraged is inclusive of different 
perspectives or “voices,” the achievement of the standard of excellence of “peer review 
and going public” is underpinned by the virtue of justice. Conferences on teaching and 
learning represent only one of many spaces where such dialogue could take place—other 
venues include meetings with colleagues (department meetings, faculty meetings, etc.), 
policy makers, and students. 
The moral virtues of justice, courage, and truthfulness, which MacIntyre highlights 
as being fundamental to all social practices, then also seem essential for attaining the 
standards of excellence associated with SOTL. Given the important role that virtues as-
sume in relation to practices, MacIntyre (2007) furthermore concludes that a practice is 
“clearly never just a set of practical skills” (p. 193). Likewise, SOTL is never just a matter 
of knowing a lot about different learning theories, research methods, or how to carry out a 
reliable empirical investigation into teaching and learning. Abstract knowledge and skills 
or techniques are important but clearly not sufficient for SOTL. SOTL is based also on a 
practical rationality and involves (i) a disposition to ask or confront the right (and often 
difficult) questions or issues, (ii) an ability to choose the most appropriate approach to 
address these, and (iii) a willingness to honestly and accurately interpret and act on one’s 
observations or insights, the last involving an openness to change. The virtues of truthful-
ness, courage, and justice are essential for these reasons.
The moral virtues not only underpin the attainment of the standards of excellence we 
typically associate with SOTL; they also help us to recognize and realize SOTL’s internal 
goods. Why should this be the case? In pursuit of the agreed standards (a deep knowledge 
base, an inquiry-orientation, critical reflectivity, peer review, and going public), support-
ed by the virtues of justice, courage, and truthfulness, the essential good to be gained from 
the practice reveals itself. If the standards are taken seriously, and this is just another way 
of saying if they are supported by virtue, we grasp the difference between the internal and 
the external goods to be achieved through participation in SOTL. The essential good to be 
gained from this practice of critical inquiry into teaching and learning, and the exchanges 
that this involves, is not first and foremost the acquisition of an external reward (as in 
securing promotion or tenure, publishing an article, winning an award, receiving a grant, 
etc.); rather, what we recognize as personally and professionally rewarding is to inquire 
into and work towards furthering the important interests of students. And this, we saw 
earlier, is nothing less than preparing students for the world (Baxter Magolda & Teren-
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zini, 1999) by supporting the students’ striving to achieve their own potential of being, or 
their “authenticity,” through their programs of study, so they can cope with uncertainty 
and complexity (Barnett, 2004).
So far, my intent has been to show that MacIntyre’s (2007) criteria of a practice of-
fer useful tools for understanding the nature and purposes of SOTL. In the penultimate 
section of the article, I would like to move beyond MacIntyre’s account of practices and 
develop an argument for the importance of two further and overarching virtues in SOTL: 
authenticity and phronesis (practical wisdom/judgement).  
Authenticity and Phronesis in SOTL
Grimmet and Neufeld (1994) once suggested that teachers who find value and pur-
pose in doing what is in the important interests of students are guided by an “authentic 
motivation” (p. 1). Similarly, I propose that guided by the virtues of justice, courage, and 
truthfulness, SOTL emerges as an “authentic practice,” whereby scholars of teaching find 
purpose in furthering students’ important interests (the latter, as was shown, being the 
students’ own authenticity). Authenticity then emerges as a useful construct for under-
standing both the practice of SOTL and the students’ important interests. However, as an 
“authentic practice,” the scholarship of teaching also requires the development of phro-
nesis, a virtue inextricably linked to authenticity. 
Phronesis. The notion of phronesis refers to a special kind of knowledge needed to 
act and judge well in the realm of human relations, the latter by definition characterized 
by uncertainty and unpredictability. Dunne (1993) highlights that phronesis develops as 
part of a person’s life history and experience and cannot be gained from books, estab-
lished first principles, or manuals. It refers to the capacity to make judgements in a given 
situation when there is no security offered by rules and algorithms, or, as Hannah Arendt 
once put it, there are “no pillars and props” (Arendt, 1968, p. 10). 
One of the critical functions of phronesis is to facilitate the mediation between the 
universal and the particular (Dunne, 1993). Importantly, then, phronesis, or good prac-
tical judgement, is not uninformed by theoretical, abstract, and systemized knowledge. 
This is relevant given the context specificity and contingency of a professional practice 
such as teaching (Squires, 1999) and of SOTL. Although SOTL is at times referred to as 
an “evidence-based practice,” the notion of an evidence-informed practice would perhaps 
more readily convey the important role of phronesis in the interpretation of the potential 
applicability of research findings from large-scale, (quasi-)experimental studies to par-
ticular contexts. Apart from the role phronesis plays in the interpretation of “research 
evidence,” its function is of course broader, extending also to making informed and rea-
soned judgements about what is the most desirable thing to do in a particular situation, 
and then acting on those judgements. 
Aristotle famously distinguished moral virtue (such as courage and justice) from intel-
lectual virtue (such as phronesis), but as Simmons (2012) observes, “what is often over-
looked is their interconnectedness. The moral virtues require phronesis to be realized and 
phronesis rests upon a prior ground in moral virtues” (p. 25). Phronesis, then, does not 
develop independently of the virtues of justice, courage, and truthfulness, but it is sup-
ported and made possible by these virtues. Moreover, phronesis helps us to decide just 
what being appropriately just, courageous, and truthful means in a given situation. It is, 
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therefore, ultimately through phronesis that we discern what goods to pursue through 
SOTL (and can take appropriate actions to attain these goods, in particular situations and 
with particular students). But here we should keep in mind as well that phronesis is not 
positive knowledge (Kemmis, 2012), that is, an actual, documentable body of knowledge, 
but is more accurately construed as a readiness or personal disposition to make wise de-
cisions under conditions of uncertainty. So, phronesis is really the virtue concerned with 
how to act in the midst of uncertainty and with ethical deliberation. 
 Phronesis is intimately bound up with the final virtue that concerns us: authenticity. 
This point becomes clearer as we explore whether SOTL meets MacIntyre’s final criterion 
of a practice, which is the transformative function that engagement in a practice entails.
Authenticity and Transformation. MacIntyre (2007) argues that through our en-
gagement in social practices, the virtues, and our conceptions of the purposes and goods 
to be gained from each practice, “are systematically extended” (p. 187). He is making two 
points here. The first is that the virtues underpinning the practice are extended or de-
veloped through participation in the practice. The second is that practices, despite being 
grounded in traditions, are not static but can change in accordance with how, over time, 
we come to conceptualize the purposes and goods of the practices. I would like to come at 
this same observation from another angle, arguing that not only the practice changes over 
time, but through our engagement in the practice we change over time. 
We already saw that phronesis develops over time through experience, and, we might 
say, through engagement with SOTL (when underpinned by the standards of excellence 
and moral virtues). Gallagher (1992), highlighting the connection between phronesis and 
authenticity, emphasizes the transformative character of developing phronesis. Gallagher 
argues that the person involved in responding to the contingency and unpredictability of 
his or her environment is constantly “drawn out of himself towards his own possibility 
and is remade by his experience” (p. 189). The person who develops phronesis does not 
just acquire new knowledge; he or she is also changed as a result of this process. The per-
son engaged in the practice of SOTL, and who through this involvement develops phro-
nesis, is implicated in a self-transformative process (Kreber, 2013; Mezirow, 1998), mov-
ing towards greater authenticity. Striving towards certain standards of excellence also 
involves extending and transforming oneself through this process. SOTL, thus conceived, 
is essentially a process of becoming. It is a process of professional development, of finding 
professional and personal purpose and value in furthering, and in inquiring into how to 
further, the important interests of students, thus affording them the opportunity to move 
towards their own authenticity (Barnett, 2004, 2005). 
Conclusion
I began this article by highlighting the contested nature of SOTL, arguing that the fun-
damental question of what SOTL is for had not yet been defended on the basis of a theo-
retical analysis. In an attempt to do that, I carried out a systematic examination of SOTL, 
principally based on MacIntyre’s account of practices. I showed how the MacIntyrean 
notion of a practice offers helpful constructs for developing a theory-based rationale for 
the purposes and nature of SOTL, which could also provide guidance for how to engage 
in this work. 
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Moving beyond MacIntyre, I further argued that when it is underpinned not only by 
the moral virtues of justice, courage, and truthfulness but also by the overarching virtues 
of phronesis and authenticity, SOTL emerges as an authentic practice characterized by an 
“authentic motivation” (Grimmet & Neufeld, 1994, p. 1) to further the important interests 
of students. The important interests of students, I argued in reference to a wide range of 
philosophical ideas concerned with fundamental human aspirations and needs, relate to 
students’ coming into their authenticity (Barnett, 2004, 2005; Kreber, 2013), and I ex-
plained, in outline, what this would mean. 
The concept developed here is obviously markedly different from a widespread per-
spective that understands SOTL exclusively as formal empirical inquiry into teaching and 
learning processes. Of course, at times, our inquiries aimed at promoting our students’ 
important interests may evolve into formal investigations, but often they will not, and they 
certainly do not need to for our inquiries to be valuable. As I intended to show, inquiry, 
or critical reflective	inquiry, into teaching and learning, which I understand SOTL to be, 
is encouraged through critical dialogue and debate and in community with others. Such 
inquiry includes asking meaningful and often difficult questions about what teaching and 
learning in higher education are for, what role teaching plays in our academic and per-
haps personal lives, and what we consider to be really significant learning on the part of 
students. Such inquiry, sustained by the virtues of justice, courage, and truthfulness, is es-
sential for both phronesis and authenticity to develop. All five virtues are integral to SOTL.
Implied in the above considerations is the understanding that the “SOTL community 
of practice” is not limited to those who carry out systematic empirical investigations into 
teaching and learning and publish these in SOTL journals, or attend SOTL conferences; 
rather, SOTL is part of every higher education teacher’s “academic practice.” The pres-
ent discussion revealed an ideal practice of SOTL defined as formal or informal, critically 
reflective inquiry into teaching and learning, underpinned by virtues and standards of 
excellence, directed at promoting the important interests of students. SOTL, thus con-
strued, happens also in the classroom, in committee meetings, in engagement with stu-
dents and colleagues, and so forth. 
 As new initiatives to support and advance SOTL become a more regular occurrence in 
our universities, it is both timely and important to ask what essential goods and ends we 
hope these will achieve, and how these can be achieved. I suggested that MacIntyre’s ac-
count of practices offers some useful tools that can help us think this through; and I added 
the virtues of phronesis and authenticity to this analysis, as I consider these essential for 
any professional practice, including SOTL.    
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